Does benevolent theism imply pre-existence?

In Purpose in the Universe (previously discussed here and here), Tim Mulgan argues that benevolent theists’ attempts to resolve the problem of evil by invoking postmortem existence (i.e. an afterlife) are only successful if humans also enjoy some kind of pre-existence (or reincarnation). This additional metaphysical baggage gives ananthropocentric purposivism (AP) — whether in theistic or non-theistic form — an edge over benevolent theism. Although it is not decisive, it does strengthen the argument that, all things considered, AP is more likely to be true than benevolent theism.

Here’s how the argument works. Benevolent theists may respond to the problem of evil by pointing out that a benevolent god could ensure that everyone enjoys a postmortem existence that is sufficient in duration and quality to greatly outweigh any evils befallen during one’s life. The benevolent theist can accept that there are evils in this world, while denying that there are any unredeemed evils.

Mulgan responds that a problem of evil remains, however, even if postmortem existence is of the highest quality and infinite duration. Every life could still be improved by preventing any evils from occurring in the first place. Even if we can’t assume that a benevolent god would follow a principle that commits to maximizing the quality of each life, or the quality of some state of affairs, it does seem safe to assume that a benevolent god would avoid gratuitous satisficing. Satisficing occurs when there is a threshold above which any outcome is acceptable; gratuitous satisficing occurs when such a threshold is observed even though one could achieve an optimal outcome at no additional cost. For an omnipotent being, it appears that satisficing is always gratuitous. For God, “good enough” doesn’t cut it. If divine benevolence rules out gratuitous satisficing, no postmortem paradise is sufficient to provide a solution to the problem of evil.

Suppose, however, that some other defence against the problem of evil seems promising — a free will theodicy that posits contra-divine freedom (i.e. the freedom to act contrary to God’s will), for example. A CDF-based theodicy may explain why there are evils in a world created by a benevolent god. But it struggles to account for the manifest unfairness in the distribution of evils. Bad things happen to good people, and good things happen to bad people. CDF does not explain this.

If evil exists because of CDF, and we have CDF because CDF is valuable, God has good reason not to create a world without evil. But does God have good reason to create a world with an unfair distribution of evils? Mulgan thinks not. God could create a world that is just like ours, except that people in this world enjoy pre-existence. The details of how and where pre-existing people exist can be set aside. We need only specify two salient characteristics of pre-existing people. First, they exercise robust moral agency before birth. Second, they are morally responsible for the exercise of that agency at all times, including after birth. If God could create a world with pre-existing people of this kind, then he could create a world in which there is no unfairness in the distribution of evils because there are no undeserved evils. Evils would be deserved in virtue of one’s conduct during pre-existence. If moral desert has any value, then a world where people get what they deserve is better than a world where people don’t get what they deserve. And even if there is only a marginal difference in quality between these two worlds, the prohibition on gratuitous satisficing requires God to create the world with pre-existing people. Therefore, Mulgan argues, benevolent theism implies pre-existence as well as postmortem existence.

If Mulgan’s argument is successful, benevolent theism is in trouble. In fact, I would go further than Mulgan does; if benevolent theism really does imply pre-existence for these reasons, then benevolent theism is almost certainly false. Many will balk at the apparent metaphysical extravagance of pre-existence. The relation between pre-existence and worldly evil Mulgan describes also depends on highly controversial assumptions about personal identity and the grounds of moral responsibility. But more importantly, I cannot accept the moral attitude towards victims of the most profound abuse, oppression and misfortune that this view encourages. Like Mulgan, I’m generally more confident in my considered moral judgments than my metaphysical judgments. If a metaphysical view implies that the victims of the Holocaust deserved everything they got, I am warranted in rejecting that metaphysical view. If benevolent theism is to continue as a live option in a religiously ambiguous universe, Mulgan’s pre-existence argument must be confronted.